## Condorset's paradox and probability of its occurence

Sergey Verentsov Higher School of Economics 07.11.2014 49% vote for A, tolerate B and hate C 30% vote for C, tolerate B and hate A 21% vote for B, tolerate C and hate A

49% vote for A, tolerate B and hate C 30% vote for C, tolerate B and hate A 21% vote for B, tolerate C and hate A


Simple majority: A wins – 49% of voters are satisfied.

49% vote for A, tolerate B and hate C 30% vote for C, tolerate B and hate A 21% vote for B, tolerate C and hate A

Simple majority: A wins -49% of voters are satisfied.

Two-round system: C wins -51% satisfied.

A>B>C	5
A>C>B	4
B>A>C	2
B>C>A	8
C>A>B	8
C>B>A	2



B beats C by 1 vote
C beats A by 7 votes
A beats B by 5 votes

A>B>C	a
A>C>B	b
B>A>C	С
B>C>A	d
C>A>B	e
C>B>A	f

A beats B by a+b+e-c-d-f votes A beats C by a+b+c-d-e-f votes

$$p(K) = 1 - 3 \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{M} \sum_{j=0}^{M-i} \sum_{k=0}^{M-i} \frac{N!}{i! j! k! (N-i-j-k)!} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{i} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{6}\right)^{j} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{6}\right)^{k} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{N-i-j-k}; \quad M = \left[\frac{N-1}{2}\right]$$

