# Condorset's paradox and probability of its occurence 

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07.11.2014
$49 \%$ vote for $A$, tolerate $B$ and hate C $30 \%$ vote for $C$, tolerate $B$ and hate $A$ $21 \%$ vote for $B$, tolerate $C$ and hate $A$
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Simple majority: A wins $-49 \%$ of voters are satisfied.
$49 \%$ vote for $A$, tolerate $B$ and hate $C$ $30 \%$ vote for $C$, tolerate $B$ and hate $A$ $21 \%$ vote for $B$, tolerate $C$ and hate $A$

Simple majority: A wins $-49 \%$ of voters are satisfied.
Two-round system: C wins - $51 \%$ satisfied.

| $\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{C}$ | 5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\mathrm{~A}>\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{B}$ | 4 |
| $\mathrm{~B}>\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{C}$ | 2 |
| $\mathrm{~B}>\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{A}$ | 8 |
| $\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}$ | 8 |
| $\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}$ | 2 |


$B$ beats $C$ by 1 vote
C beats A by 7 votes
A beats B by 5 votes

| $\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{C}$ | a |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{B}$ | b |
| $\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{C}$ | c |
| $\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{A}$ | d |
| $\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}$ | $e$ |
| $\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}$ | f |

A beats B by $a+b+e-c-d-f$ votes
A beats C by $a+b+c-d-e-f$ votes

$$
p(K)=1-3 \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{M} \sum_{j=0}^{M-i} \sum_{k=0}^{M-i} \frac{N!}{i!\cdot j!\cdot k!\cdot(N-i-j-k)!} \cdot\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{i} \cdot\left(\frac{1}{6}\right)^{j} \cdot\left(\frac{1}{6}\right)^{k} \cdot\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{N-i-j-k} \quad ; \quad M=\left[\frac{N-1}{2}\right]
$$



