• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
Контакты

Адрес:  603155, Н. Новгород, Б.Печерская, 25/12, к. 404

Телефоны менеджеров

Руководство

Декан Штефан Мария Александровна

Заместитель декана по работе с абитуриентами и студентами Сучкова Екатерина Олеговна

Заместитель декана по научной работе и международным связям Новак Анна Евгеньевна

Книга
Предприятия в условиях высокой турбулентности внешней экономической среды

Рябова Е. В., Абрамова М. А., Бабанов В. Н. и др.

Вып. 2. Н. Новгород: НОО "Профессиональная наука", 2018.

Глава в книге
A Methodology for Empirically Measuring the Extent of Economic Analysis and Evidence and for Identifying the Legal Standards in Competition Law Enforcement

Katsoulacos Y., Avdasheva S. B., Golovanova S.

In bk.: Frédéric Jenny Liber Amicorum: Standing Up for Convergence and Relevance in Antitrust. Vol. 1. Concurrences, 2019. P. 131-150.

Препринт
THE RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE: IS IT REALLY EXCELLENCE THAT IS PROMOTED?

Matveeva N., Sterligov I., Yudkevich M. M.

Education. EDU. Высшая школа экономики, 2019. No. WP BRP 49/EDU/2019.

Семинар Алексея Парахоняка на тему "Information design through scarcity and social learning"

Мероприятие завершено
В понедельник, 1 июля, в 17.00 в 414 ауд. состоится семинар Парахоняка Алексея Никитича (University of Oxford), выпускника бакалавриата факультета экономики НИУ ВШЭ – Нижний Новгород 2002 года, по статье "Information design through scarcity and social learning".

Authors: Alexei Parakhonyak and Nick Vikander

Abstract: We show that a firm may benefit from strategically creating scarcity for its product, in order to trigger herding behavior from consumers in situations where such behavior is otherwise unlikely. We consider a setting with social learning, where consumers observe sales from previous cohorts and update beliefs about product quality before making their purchase. Imposing a capacity constraint directly limits sales but also makes information coarser for consumers, who react favorably to a sell-out because they only infer that demand must exceed capacity. Neither large cohorts nor unbounded private signals guarantee efficient learning, because the firm acts strategically to influence the consumers' learning environment. Our results show that capacity constraints can serve as a practical tool for information design: if private signals are not too precise and capacity can be changed over time, then in large markets the firm's optimal choice of capacity delivers the same expected sales as the Bayesian persuasion solution.

Приглашаются все желающие!