12 January 2012, 11.00 lecture of professor Aleskerov

Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule

12 January 2012, 11.00, room 401, 136 Rodionova.

Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule

Abstract: Various Condorcet consistent social choice functions based on majority rule (tournament solutions) are considered in the general case, when ties are allowed: the core, the weak and strong top cycle sets, versions of the uncovered and minimal weakly stable sets, the uncaptured set, the untrapped set, classes of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets. The main focus of the paper is to construct a unified matrix-vector representation of a tournament solution in order to get a convenient algorithm for its calculation. New versions of some solutions are proposed.